

Dynamics of Personalization of Political Parties in the Recruitment of Prospective Candidates for Mayor of Solo 2020 (Case Study of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P))

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ABSTRACT: This study aims to explain the dynamics that occur in the recruitment process for candidates for Mayor of Solo in the 2020 simultaneous local elections. These dynamics are influenced by personalized action within the party characterized by the dominance of the general chairperson and the weakness of the party organization. The method used in this research is descriptive qualitative using primary and secondary data including interviews, documentation, and literature study. The results obtained from this study indicate that there are problems in the recruitment function for candidates for Mayor of Solo, including intervention from the Party Chairperson as a result of his strong domination in political parties so that the party structure at the local level, namely the PDI-P DPC Surakarta City cannot implementing a bottom-up scheme by nominating candidates based on the election results. The weakness of party institutions can also be seen in party regulations regarding the recruitment of regional heads which are not implemented properly, not reflected in the principles of democracy within the party, the lack of independence of the party structure at the local level, to the pragmatism of the party by nominating a solo mayoral candidate based on the candidate's social background. is the son of the son of President Joko Widodo who is currently in office.

Keywords: Recruitment function; party personalization; domination of the general chairman; weak party organization



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INTRODUCTION

Recruitment is one of the functions of political parties, namely as a means of cadre formation to select individuals to fill political or government positions (Haryanto, 1982). The role of parties in regional elections can be said to be suppliers of regional head candidates. As stated by Andre Bayo Ala (1985), a political party is an association that nominates its candidates to be elected through elections to obtain office.

Political parties are actually a political infrastructure where party management needs to apply democratic principles within it so that it can also be said that political parties are a parameter in democracy itself. Especially in relation to the democratization process in Indonesia in terms of

regional head elections which now use a direct election format by the people. The democratization process must of course be in line with not only how the regional elections are held, but also the selection of candidates within political parties(Gunther & Diamond, n.d.).

It can be said that democracy in political parties is closely related to the selection of candidates itself in two main dimensions, namely centralization and inclusiveness(Fiorelli, 2022; Hazan & Rahat, n.d.-a). This can be seen from the election at the local level political party structure because the decision is decentralized for those represented by candidates and of course more people participate in the process, giving voters more rights. However, along the way, regional elections are often marred by practices that do not reflect democratic values, especially in the recruitment of regional head candidates within political parties(Musella, 2020; Perez et al., 2023).

Research conducted by Gunawan (2018) states that the principles of democracy are not reflected in internal political parties where the authority of the party DPP is very strong in determining the candidates who will compete in the regional elections, while the party DPC is limited to proposing the names of candidates even though they have gone through an enhanced screening process. area(Gunawan, 2018).

This condition can be said to be a democratic crisis in the implementation of regional elections where political party elites at both the national and local levels have a strong role in the recruitment process of prospective candidates who will be candidates who will run in regional head elections (Haboddin, 2016)(Haßler et al., 2023; Kausar et al., 2023).

The phenomenon as described above cannot be separated from a problem with political parties today. Before the simultaneous regional elections are held, generally internal political parties themselves show a tendency towards the interests of their leaders so that the parties themselves are trapped in what is called personalization. Personalization shows the authority of high-ranking party officials who have complete control over their party so that the party is far from democratic principles.

Personalization of political parties can be interpreted as the condition of individuals who have an important positioning within the party who are able to change the party which basically has a collective identity into personal interests(Gherghina & Grad, 2021). A visible characteristic of party personalization is that the leader holds great power as seen in determining the direction and vision of the party's platform and campaign; nominate candidates; deciding on the allocation of organizational resources; and wield power over politicians in their parties. Moreover, party officials and politicians recognize and accept this power as legitimate authority. The next characteristic is the weak institutional system of political parties, especially when it comes to the recruitment of regional head candidates. Independence of the party structure at the local level cannot occur due to its limited authority so that the recruitment that occurs often does not reflect regional representation so this tends to be seen as a manipulative practice.

As one of the major parties in Indonesia, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) has a fairly large power base, especially in the city of Solo which can be said to be the headquarters of the party. The leadership relay for the mayor of Solo is almost always held by PDI-P cadres at

every regional election event. The simultaneous regional elections in 2020 will be a momentum to regain the power of the mayor of Solo.

In determining which candidates will be nominated to compete in the regional election contestation, PDI-P has its own mechanism that regulates this. As stated in party regulations Number 24 of 2017, the regional head recruitment process in this regulation is implemented in stages based on where the regional elections are held.

In the case of the city of Solo, in the 2020 simultaneous regional elections, the PDI-P DPC has determined prospective candidates through a closed selection mechanism where the entire party structure has provided support for the candidate pair Achmad Purnomo and Teguh Prakosa as candidates for Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Solo 2020. This decision is based on agreement and also support starting from the Management of PDI-P Branches, Branches and Subsidiaries (GatraCom, 2019). The announcement of the 45 regional head candidates who will compete in the regional elections simultaneously includes the name Gibran Rakabuming Raka accompanied by Teguh Prakosa who is running in the Solo mayoral election. Gibran himself was selected as a candidate for mayor of Solo after receiving a recommendation from PDI-P General Chair Megawati Soekarno Putri (VOI, 2020).

For this reason, as stated by Cross and Bottomore (in Pamungkas, 2011)(Cross, n.d.), political recruitment becomes the face or character of the political party itself, which means 1) recruitment can indicate the pattern of power within the political party, namely whether the power is centralized or decentralized. ; 2) recruitment can also show whether or not there is elite rotation within the political party so that it has an impact on the party's image in front of the public; and 3) political recruitment can define the type or characteristics of a political party.

Based on the previous description, this research focuses on two questions including:

1. What is the recruitment process for 2020 Solo Mayor candidates for the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, in which there are dynamics that show party personalization?;
2. What are the factors behind the naming of Gibran Rakabuming Raka as a candidate for mayor of Solo?

METHOD

This research uses a descriptive qualitative method with several data collection techniques such as interviews, literature study and documentation. The data analysis technique used is flow chart analysis with four stages of data analysis including data collection, data reduction, data presentation, and drawing conclusions.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

In the recruitment process for Solo Mayor candidates carried out by the PDI Surakarta DPC, screening was the main stage carried out. As the party that has the largest number of legislative seats in the DPRD which has fulfilled the requirements in accordance with Law no. 8 of 2015 allows PDI-P to nominate its own cadres. The selection process, which was attended by the entire

party structure, starting from the Branch Management (PAC), Sub-Branch and Sub-Branch Committees, was carried out through deliberations at every level in the party structure. The results of the general deliberations decided that the name Achmad Purnomo would be a candidate for Mayor of Solo. The level of cadre participation in the decision-making process at this stage is quite good.

In principle, the mechanism for the process of selecting prospective candidates is carried out referring to party regulations. This was stated by the chairman of the PDI Surakarta DPC, F. This can be seen from the suitability of assignments to members or cadres of the party being promoted. Based on the applicable provisions in article 9 of party regulation No. 24 of 2017, when a party's vote share exceeds 25% of legislative seats, the party has the authority to nominate its own cadres where these cadres also have a strong voter power base, supported by the candidate's own eligibility data, and a party structure such as a solid Branch Manager or Sub-Branch Management.

Achmad Purnomo himself was assessed by the entire party structure as having met the qualification requirements to become a Candidate for Mayor of Solo, one of the conditions being that he had been a party cadre for at least two years. Apart from that, the figure of Achmad Purnomo is widely known and has a track record both within the party and in government. As we all know, Achmad Purnomo was Deputy Mayor of Solo in the previous period, namely in partnership with FX Hadi Rudyatmo. With the release of the results of the selection which decided the pair Achmad Purnomo as candidate for Mayor of Solo and Teguh Prakosa as candidate for Deputy Mayor of Solo, DPC PDI-P Surakarta City issued an official report which was submitted to DPP PDI-P.

The process that the PDIP Surakarta DPC has gone through indicates that there has been inclusiveness within the political party for a while. This is characterized by involving all party administrators starting from the PDIP Surakarta DPC itself down to the sub-branches. This means that many parties are involved in the networking process. The mechanism for selecting prospective candidates involving many cadres shows that the selection of prospective candidates has been carried out by upholding the principle of inclusivity. This is in line with the category created by Hazan and Rahat which states that when participation is so large, in this case the selection, it can be said that the election is inclusive (Hazan & Rahat, n.d.-b). However, inclusiveness as described above is limited, because this kind of open selection process only occurs at the DPC level. When the process is continued at the level above, the networking process is actually carried out in a closed manner.

This selection can be said to be a recruitment process that is carried out behind closed doors, which means that if the PDI-P gets more than 25% of the votes, it becomes the PDI-P's domain to nominate candidates from its party members without the need for a coalition with other parties. This is purely within the authority of internal party as stated in article 9 of party regulation no. 24 of 2017 when the party obtained a legislative vote of 25% or more, but in the selection process carried out by the Surakarta City PDI-P DPC, it was a shame that there was no competition in it. The chairman of the Surakarta City PDI-P DPC also explained that there were no other names besides Achmad Purnomo in the selection (Rudyatmo, 2022).

Hazan and Rahat in their discussion measure democracy within parties, one of which is related to nominations. Nominations are defined as individuals who are deemed to have met the standards

set out in party regulations. Inclusive nominations indicate that every party member has the right to take part in the selection, meaning that there are regulations that are not too strict regarding the nomination so that the number of candidates will be large.

On the other hand, exclusive nominations are influenced by strict regulations. Like the selection carried out by the Surakarta City PDI-P DPC which only produced one candidate, namely Achmad Purnomo, with one of them implementing the minimum age limit as a PDI-P cadre, namely two years. Azan and Rahat also explained that the political party's decision to implement exclusive nominations was basically made to control nominations so that the resulting candidates had potential and were worthy of being nominated. The selection carried out by the Surakarta City PDIP DPC has the requirements mentioned previously, namely the minimum age as a PDI-P party cadre. However, in terms of the quality of the candidate himself, Achmad Purnomo, according to the Chairman of the Surakarta City PDI-P DPC, explained that he had contributed both within the party and as a public official over a period of seven years, meaning that Achmad Purnomo himself had a promising political track record.

Continuing with the determination process, in this process the determination of regional head candidates as contained in PDI-P party regulations No. 24 of 2017 becomes the authority of the PDI-P DPP. The determination of regional head candidates is a concern because this shows how the party is managed in carrying out its recruitment function within the party. In determining the candidate for Mayor of Solo who will take part in the 2020 simultaneous regional elections, it shows the influence of the decision of the General Chair of the Party, namely Megawati Soekarnopoetri. DPC Chairman F. Referring to the PDI-Perjuangan AD/ART in article 8 regarding Assignments in Executive Institutions, paragraph (7) explains that the prerogative only states that the prerogative of the General Chairperson applies to party members assigned as President and/or Vice President, Minister and/or Deputy (Galih, 2020). Minister. Regarding regional heads themselves, it is explained in the next paragraph (8) that party members assigned as Regional Heads and/or Deputy Regional Heads are further regulated by party regulations. The party regulations also do not contain any prerogatives of the general chairman. In article 19 in Party Regulation no. 24 of 2017 states that the screening and determination process is the authority of the Party's Central Leadership Council (DPP).

After receiving a recommendation from the Surakarta City PDI-P DPC through an official report which stated that Achmad Purnomo was the proposed candidate for mayor, the PDI-P DPP had another name. Megawati Soekarnoputri as general chair of the party has her own choice by appointing Gibran Raka bumingraka as the Candidate for Mayor of Solo 2020. With her prerogative rights, of course this decision is absolute and binding on all PDI-P cadres. This decision also did not involve party officials at the local level, namely the DPC PDI-P Surakarta, which incidentally had a role in the simultaneous regional elections in the city of Surakarta. The existence of these prerogative rights is basically not mentioned explicitly in party regulation no. 24 of 2017. In this regulation it is stated that the Party DPP has the authority to carry out screening and determination. Adding to this, the DPP also requires all party structures to win the candidates determined by the DPP. This is stated in article 19 paragraphs 6 and 7 of the party regulations. The existence of the General Chairperson's prerogative rights actually violates party regulations, because in these regulations there is a screening process which takes into account the candidate's

data and eligibility, minutes, various test results that the candidate has passed so that the existence of the prerogative allows candidates who basically have eligibility and have gone through the process. previous screening was ruled out. As Tatiana and Berry said, there are formal provisions related to recruitment, but the implementation is only on paper, while actual recruitment is carried out by leaders and is accepted without any differences of opinion.

This decision certainly became a polemic within the party because if you look at the party regulations, there is a mechanism where a candidate needs to go through a selection mechanism, which in this case is carried out by the Surakarta City PDI-P DPC. F.

Gibran's passing as a candidate for mayor of Solo can be said to be a violation of his own party's regulations by the general chairman of the party. In fact, it can be said that Gibran himself does not meet the administrative requirements, namely the minimum age requirement as a party cadre. Ujang Komarudin, Executive Director of the Indonesia Political Review (IPR), believes that this kind of phenomenon is not good for political parties because parties show arbitrary behavior towards their own party rules. Another thing that was highlighted was the political discretion exercised by the general chairman, in this case by nominating Gibran as a candidate for Mayor of Solo (Komarudin, 2022). In article 9 in Party Regulation no. 24 of 2017 states that parties assign party members or cadres as regional head candidates by nominating themselves or being supported by other political parties, one of which is supported by data and information on candidate suitability as well as adequate political mapping results and a solid Branch Management or Sub-Branch Management party structure. and strong. It has been previously mentioned that the party structure has basically approved Achmad Purnomo based on the results of the selection process and that he has the qualifications in the form of political experience during his time in government. In article 11 of party regulation no. 24 of 2017 states that the selection process related to the recruitment of regional head candidates is carried out in stages when the regional elections are held at the city/district level, of course this is the domain of the DPC as the first party to carry out the selection process, which includes a registration mechanism. It can be said that Gibran's name itself did not go through the initial process, namely the selection process carried out by the PDI-Perjuangan DPC for Surakarta City. Gibran himself registered through the PDI-Perjuangan DPD because the selection process had closed and he had named Achmad Purnomo as a potential candidate for Mayor of Solo (Prastiwi, 2019).

The decision to appoint Gibran certainly cannot be separated from the interests behind it. This was conveyed by political observer Mr. Adi Prayitno who stated that Gibran himself would become Jokowi's successor when he could prove himself as Mayor of Solo. There are advantages to supporting Gibran for the PDI-Perjuangan itself. He considered that in the previous presidential election, many of Jokowi's supporters felt that they were not part of the PDI-Perjuangan, so that the presence of Gibran himself could secure Jokowi's voters (Rastika, 2021). Jokowi's big name was certainly a consideration for Gibran's appointment as Mayor of Solo. This also reflects Jokowi's own term of office which will end in 2024. Of course, Gibran himself is projected to be Jokowi's successor with the same prefix as Mayor of Solo. Not only that, in the same year regional elections will be held, of course there is the potential to enhance Gibran's own political career.

The dynamics that occur within the PDI-P party in determining the candidate for Mayor of Solo 2020 show that the current phenomenon of political parties is trapped in a condition where there

is a strong influence of the party chairman in all political party activities, including in this case the determination of regional head candidates. This influences how the management and institutions of political parties are carried out. Political parties should be closely aligned with collective goals but instead they are used as a means to fulfill the general chairman's desires.

This condition shows that there are problems within the PDI-P party in carrying out one of its functions, namely recruitment, in this case the recruitment of prospective candidates for Mayor of Solo in 2020. In fact, political parties apply democratic values such as participation, decentralization of authority, representation and competition as a form of description of political parties, especially when looking at the existence of these parties in countries that implement a democratic system. The recruitment function ultimately shows how the party has been managed so far, referring to the classification of the PDI-P party, namely what is called a personalized party. Tatiana Kostadinova and Barry Levitt stated that there are at least two conditions that show that political parties are trapped in a centralized party condition, namely the dominance of the party chairman and weak organizational capacity (Kostadinova & Levitt, 2014).

a. Domination of the General Chairman of the Party

The main indication that political parties are trapped in personalized conditions is the dominance of the party chairman. The dominance of the general chairman of the party indicates that he plays a central role in the political party so that he carries full power in terms of authority (Quinlan & McAllister, 2022). When looking back at how political parties were formed, it cannot be separated from the central role of one individual who actually had a role in establishing a party. One of them is Megawati Soekarnoputri in the PDI-P party. Devi Darmawan assesses that her long term as party leader has fulfilled the characteristics of a personalized party (Budiarti, 2018).

Megawati's position within the party as founder and general chairman is basically the main factor behind and initiating the domination of one individual within the party, so it can be said that the dominance of the General Chair within a political party is considered something normal.

Megawati Soekarnoputri's significant influence within the PDI-P party created a relationship between cadres of high loyalty to her. This was conveyed by the Chairman of the PDI-P DPC for Surakarta City. When the final decision was issued, the cadres at the regional level immediately closed ranks and accepted the decision and were ready to win over Gibran Rakabumingraka and Teguh Prakosa. He also said that cadres are required to obey the Party's AD/ART and the General Chair's decisions. The relationship of loyalty to the general chairman is an asymmetrical power relationship in a personalist party. Formally, it is defined as holding broad power within the party with reference to unilateral decision making, nominations, appointments and policies.

Seeing how the dominance of the general chairman in a political party accompanies all party activities, especially those related to unilaterally appointing regional heads, increasingly shows that party personalization is very visible and even shows how the PDI-P party is managed. With the grassroots of the party directly stating that the decision to appoint the regional head is the domain of the general chairman, the power used by the general chairman in this case is declared as legitimate authority, even though this is contrary to the institutional management of political

parties which emphasizes sovereignty. Political parties are based on members of political parties who prioritize deliberation.

b. Weak Organizational Capacity

Weak organizational capacity in this case, namely political parties, can be seen from the lack of implementation of democracy within the party. There is no clear mechanism for reducing various internal conflicts. Regarding recruitment itself, it does not have fixed criteria so that it becomes a reference within the party itself. Basically, regulations regarding recruitment exist, but are often not implemented properly so that the phenomenon that often occurs is that recruitment is carried out by leaders and members only agree to the decision (Gunther & Diamond, n.d.).

Recruitment within the PDI-P Party shows that there are weaknesses in the party organization. This is not only seen in party regulations that are not implemented. Party regulations are actually implemented by all party members but are only procedural rules without serious implementation, apart from that they are also related to differences of opinion, member participation in decisions, and the difficulty for party structures at the local level to implement bottom-up schemes. up by providing recommendations for regional head candidates (Dodeigne & Pilet, 2021). Tatiana and Berry stated that in the criteria weak political party organization is characterized by the lack of development of the party organizational structure, in this case the party structure at the local level, because the increasingly strong dominance of the General Chair over time erodes the political authority of the local level party structure so that this causes the relationship between the center and Locally there is no reciprocal communication.

The PDI-P Surakarta DPC was not given the freedom to determine its own candidate. In fact, the party structure at the local level better understands figures who have the capacity to become Solo Mayor Candidates. Moreover, the candidates put forward are old cadres, have a political track record in the city of Solo and have fulfilled the administrative requirements for the selection process, it could even be said that the candidates put forward by the PDIP Surakarta DPC can be said to have strong legitimacy because they have gone through a series of recruitment mechanisms in accordance with PDI party regulations. -P. Of course, this causes the independence of the party structure at the local level to be reduced as a result of political intervention in the interests of the Party General Chair. Phenomenons like this increasingly make the PDI-P party look weak institutionally.

Tatiana and Barry provide an illustration that in the case of personalized parties, party regulations are often found that indicate differences of opinion whose reality is ignored and even ignored so that the party's organizational capacity is weakened in the interests of the party leader (Kostadinova & Levitt, n.d.). This also happened internally in the PDI-P as a result of the selection process, which could basically be taken into consideration by the DPP, but what was ignored was that the party's DPC did not have any authority.

Weak party institutions can also be seen in the lack of democracy within the party. The PDI-P Surakarta DPC is not involved in determining the candidate for Mayor of Solo. This is due to the strong influence of the Party General Chairman within the party which causes the distribution of power to be hampered. As a result of the decision issued by the General Chair, the representation

of mayoral candidates is not visible because the decision on this provision is not based on the collective interests of the political party and its constituents in the region, but is based on the political interests of the party elite, in this case the General Chair. Ujang Komarudin said that it was difficult to get representation because decisions were still held by the party elite. As a result, the identity of the party shows elitist and dynastic power, for this reason it is necessary to correct party institutions, due to the fact that representation is not implemented in political life (Komarudin, 2020).

The weak organizational capacity of political parties in terms of recruitment of regional head candidates means that the decisions of candidates for Mayor of Surakarta are pragmatic. Executive Director of the Indonesia Political Review (IPR) Ujang Komarudin stated that this decision could not be separated from Gibran's own social background as the biological son of President Joko Widodo (Komarudin, 2022). This makes the opportunity to win the mayoral election quite large. Joko Widodo's figure cannot be separated from the city of Surakarta, where he served for two terms as Mayor of Solo. Its relationship with PDI-P itself can be said to be very close considering that PDI-P is the party supporting Jokowi, both as Mayor of Solo, Governor of DKI Jakarta, and even as President. The strong relationship between Joko Widodo and PDI-P certainly opened a big door for Gibran to gain access to various PDI-P elites, so that when Gibran decided to enter the political arena, it became the attention of the PDI-P party because this could increase votes by nominate Gibran as Mayor of Solo, so that he can increase the enthusiasm of the party's movement machine (Wibiyanto et al., 2021).

Social background is one of the supporting factors for a person to attract people, especially for political parties, to choose them as their candidate. Social background is defined as political capital that comes from the candidate's own social, economic status and family background (Czudnowski in Tricahyono (2005)). In fact, in Gibran, this was what was dominant in his image when he decided to run in the Solo political contestation. In the end, this condition was seen in a survey which stated that Gibran's own level of popularity had increased due to the names of his parents' figures reaching 80%. Other research also states that the name Joko Widodo as President who is also Gibran's biological father influences Gibran's electability level which continues to soar, which makes him confident to run for the 2020 Solo city elections (Asrawijaya, 2022).

CONCLUSION

The recruitment of regional head candidates carried out internally by the PDI-P in determining Solo mayoral candidates shows a problematic side in terms of political party institutions. The dynamics that occur in the recruitment process starting from the selection process to determining the candidate for mayor of Solo in the 2020 simultaneous regional elections are viewed from the personalization of political parties, there are two main criteria behind the discontinuity between party regulations regarding the recruitment of regional heads and their implementation.

First, the dominance of the general chairman can be seen in determining the candidate for Mayor of Solo. The appointment of Gibran as a candidate for Mayor of Solo was carried out unilaterally by Megawati Soekarnoputri without involving other party structures, especially the DPC PDI-P

Surakarta. This is based on the prerogative rights of the general chairman. The general chairman's dominance within the PDI-P is also based on his position within the party, not only as party leader but also the founder of the party, so that his influence on party policy is very dominant, which includes decisions, appointments, or in this case the nomination of Mayor of Solo.

Second, the party's organizational capacity is weak. According to Gunther and Diamond, it is characterized by an undeveloped organizational structure with the absence of democratic principles, more so the influence of the general chairman which causes decisions to be centralized. Regarding the recruitment regulations themselves, basically there are these regulations but they are only procedural in nature without proper implementation and it is explained that the recruitment itself is carried out by the leader and is accepted without any differences of opinion (Gunther & Diamond, 2003). This can be seen internally in the PDI-Perjuangan, which is characterized by party regulations regarding the recruitment of prospective candidates that are not implemented properly. Party Regulation No. 24 of 2017 can be said to be merely procedural and is not even implemented by the general chairman of the party. Democratic principles that are not visible in the recruitment process also indicate a weak party organizational capacity. Competition participation and the diffusion of power are not visible in the recruitment process for Solo Mayor candidates carried out internally by the PDI-P. The recruitment process ultimately showed centralized decision making which was characterized by the inability of the local level party structure to implement a bottom-up scheme by determining candidates based on the results of the selection carried out by the PDI-Perjuangan DPC for the city of Surakarta, namely Achmad Purnomo as the candidate for Mayor of Solo. The PDI-P's pragmatic attitude in determining the candidate for Mayor of Solo in the 2020 simultaneous regional elections took into account Gibran's social background, namely as the biological son of President Joko Widodo who had a significant influence in improving Gibran's image and popularity, so it was the main factor in why he was chosen.

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